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Abstract
 Why the enthusiasm for peace faded? What are the perspec-
tives for peace in Colombia? How peace came to be understood 
as the opposite to security? In this paper I want to make sense of 
the first two questions, leaving for another time the third one. But 
I would like to say, that peace and security are not opposites, for 
peace without security is unstable, and security without peace is au-
thoritarian and undemocratic. In the first part of this paper I wish 
to show a brief history of past peace processes in Colombia in order 
to highlight the elements that have led to success or failure in the 
past. In the second part I focus on Andres Pastrana´ s peace process 
to show how it set the bases for the discredit peace processes cur-
rently have and then I analyze how peace became a dirty word in 
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Colombia´ s political conversation and the possibilities of recovering 
peace as part of public discussion.
Keywords
Peace talks, security, Colombian guerrillas, fragile states, hu-
man rights.
Resumen
¿Por qué se desvaneció el entusiasmo por la paz? ¿Cuáles son las 
perspectivas para la paz en Colombia? ¿Cómo llegó la paz a ser en-
tendida como lo opuesto a la seguridad? En este texto intento darle 
respuesta a las dos primeras preguntas, dejando para otra investiga-
ción la respuesta a la tercera. Sin embargo me gustaría decir que paz 
y seguridad no son términos contrarios, pues la paz sin seguridad 
es inestable, y la seguridad sin paz es autoritaria y antidemocrática. 
En la primera parte de este texto deseo hacer una breve historia de 
los anteriores procesos de paz en Colombia con el fin de resaltar 
los elementos que han conducido al éxito o al fracaso. En la segun-
da parte me ocupo de analizar el proceso del gobierno de Andrés 
Pastrana para mostrar cómo sentó las bases para el descrédito que 
actualmente tienen las negociaciones de paz y luego me ocupo de 
analizar cómo la paz se convirtió en anatema en la retórica política 
colombiana y las posibilidades de recuperar la idea de la paz para la 
discusión pública.
Palabras clave
Negociaciones de paz, guerrillas colombianas, estados frágiles, 
derechos humanos.
Colombia´s Elusive Peace: Perspectives for a Peace Process in Colombia
201
Universidad de San Buenaventura,
sede Bogotá
Introduction
On January 7th 1999, the President Andres Pastrana traveled to 
the region of El Caguán –in the southern part of the country- for 
the ceremony that launched the peace process with the Fuerzas Ar-
madas Revolucionarias de Colombia FARC. This trip was the result 
of a process of negotiation between FARC and the government and 
it was supposed to symbolize the moment wherein Colombia would 
finally walk her first steps to peace. People were enthusiastic about 
the perspectives for peace and politicians believed in the possibility 
of reaching peace via dialogue and negotiation. Juan Manuel San-
tos –current president of Colombia and then director of an NGO- 
wrote that a peaceful and negotiated solution is the only reasonable 
exit for Colombian armed conflict (Santos, 2004). The moment of 
the meeting between the leaders of both parties –Pastrana repre-
senting the Colombian state and Manuel Marulanda Vélez repre-
senting FARC- was broadcasted on national TV. It was supposed 
to be a historical and happy moment. However, on Pastrana´ s right 
side people could watch an empty seat. Colombians were expecting 
the moment Marulanda would show up. But this moment never 
came, and Pastrana had to seat during the whole ceremony alone, 
without a partner for the talks, as if peace was something that was 
of his own concern.1 In that way, the empty seat began to symbolize 
quite the opposite it was hoped: It symbolized tiredness with peace 
talks and a complete lack of trust to guerrilla´ s rhetoric of peace.
 This moment marked the beginning and the demise of the 
last peace process with guerrillas. People´ s enthusiasm for peace was 
fading as news from El Caguán periodically arrived showing the 
1 Marulanda and FARC claimed that there was a plan to kill him. According to FARC, Marulanda 
decided to not show up at the last minute when he learnt that his life was in danger. He never-
theless sent a letter where he explained the reasons why FARC was fighting this war.
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lack of interest FARC had in the conversations. People learnt that 
FARC kept doing their illegal activities – kidnappings and drug 
traffic – taking advantage of the region that was left for them.2 It 
was clear for everyone that FARC were using these negotiations to 
gain political and military advantages. But the military was also us-
ing this sort of truce to begin a process of reconstruction that would 
show its results some years later.
The elections 2002-2006 were marked by a clear disappoint-
ment with peace talks, and the right wing candidate –Alvaro Uribe 
Vélez- won the presidency by offering authority and by promising 
the military defeat of FARC. To him peace meant the final destruc-
tion of Colombian guerrillas.
 The presidential campaign in 2010 was characterized by the 
way peace or peace processes took a low profile. Several NGOs in-
vited presidential candidates to take part in a debate on peace and 
the perspectives for a peace process in Colombia, but all of them 
rejected it because they considered that it was not wise to partici-
pate in such a debate, given the lack of support this idea had among 
Colombian voters (Interview to Pedro Santana, Viva la Ciudadanía. 
Bogotá May 2010). In a nutshell, to talk about peace meant losing 
the election.
The debates during the first and second round showed presi-
dential candidates willing to let voters know they were hard lin-
ers when peace talks were on the table. Candidate Antanas Mockus 
went so far to advise guerrillas to negotiate with Uribe´ s administra-
tion because he was not going to give any room for peace talks or 
for any kind of negotiations with FARC. Now there was no enthu-
siasm for peace, public opinion was more inclined to mano dura and 
2  FARC were given a region as big as Switzerland free of military control.
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to a military solution of the conflict, even if that meant curtailing 
their rights and degrading an already degraded democracy.
 Why the enthusiasm for peace faded? What are the perspec-
tives for peace in Colombia? How peace came to be understood as 
the opposite to security? In this paper I want to make sense of the 
first two questions, leaving for another time the third one. But I 
would like to say, that peace and security are not opposites, for peace 
without security is unstable, and security without peace is authori-
tarian and undemocratic.3 In the first part of this paper I wish to 
show a brief history of past peace processes in Colombia in order to 
highlight the elements that have led to success or failure in the past. 
In the second part I focus on the peace process of Andres Pastrana’s 
administration to show how it set the bases for the discredit peace 
processes currently have and then I analyze how peace became a 
dirty word in Colombia´ s political conversation and the possibilities 
of recovering peace as part of the public discussion.
Peace processes from 1958-1982: The hegemony of amnesty 
laws.-
In a collection that was published in 2003 to celebrate one hun-
dred years of the end of the last war of the 19th century –known as 
the “1000 days War”- the editors concluded that in spite of the fact 
that in Colombia there had been more than 80 civil wars since the 
very beginning of its independent life, there had also been a similar 
number of peace processes. In Colombia there is a strong commit-
ment to peace, which is reflected in the high number of peace pro-
cesses (Medina, 2003) and the high number of local and national 
3 It is important to take into account that peace and security are not opposites, for peace without 
security is unstable, and security without peace is authoritarian and undemocratic.
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peace initiatives.4 Traditionally wars ended in Colombia with the 
celebration of a peace agreement and the passing of a new constitu-
tion or a constitutional reform. Hernando Valencia holds that con-
stitutions play the role peace treaties have, because they contained 
all the elements that elites want to leave clear in order to avoid future 
confrontations (Valencia Villa, 1986). In fact, if we trace back the 
history of Colombian constitutions we can see that they are the end 
of long processes that are the result of war and violence. Constitu-
tions set the political arrangements with which elites are willing to 
live in the future. Traditionally these arrangements have rules to 
access power and rules to solve disputes between opposite factions.
After a long period of Conservative control, in 1930 Enrique 
Olaya –liberal candidate- became president of Colombia. As a re-
sult conservatives had to leave positions and lost what they thought 
was their private property. Given that there were no rules to have 
access to public jobs and they only depended on the ideological af-
filiation they had, it was reasonable to expect that conservatives 
had to resign their positions and see how liberals filled them with 
their own people. Political and social exclusion endangered the new 
government. In the countryside liberals and conservatives saw each 
other with distrust and rancor. Violence erupted, mainly because 
conservatives did not want to accept the idea that they did not have 
power anymore. As a result of divisions among the Liberal Party 
for the presidential elections in 1946-1950, they lost the presidency 
and conservatives became the government for another time. Liberal 
4 The Bank of Good Practices of the United Nations Development Program for Colombia has 
registered more that 300 peace initiatives. I do not discuss these initiatives here, but they are 
analyzed by Oscar Useche in his article on peace initiatives in Colombia in a book that shows 
the result of the research project of which this paper is also part. See Oscar Useche. “Formas 
comunitarias del pacifismo en Colombia. Las resistencias no violentas”. In Farid Benavides 
and Eduard Vinyamata, eds. El largo camino hacia la paz. Procesos e Iniciativas de Paz en 
Colombia y Ecuador. Barcelona: Editorial UOC, 2011.
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candidate Jorge Eliecer Gaitán was the strongest candidate for the 
Liberal party. He was a populist and a nationalist with big support 
from the population. It was clear that he was going to become the 
next president of Colombia. However, on April 9th 1948 he was 
assassinated, and this crime released all the rage that Liberals and 
the working class in general were keeping against the government. 
During this period (1958 – 1962), known as La Violencia- more 
than 200.000 people were killed and a high number of peasants 
were forcibly displaced. Crimes against humanity were committed 
against liberals and communists; the government created a political 
police known as La Chulavita. Violence was all over around; public 
institutions were not trusted; and fear dominated social relations. 
Conservatives allied with the military and established a military dic-
tatorship, with Gustavo Rojas Pinilla as its president (Guzmán et al, 
2008).
Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957) passed an amnesty law in order to 
demobilize liberal guerrillas. Some of the groups decided to sur-
render their guns, but others did not see this amnesty law as the 
solution to their problems. It is important t take into account that 
the only offer the government had for the rebels was to pardon their 
crimes, especially the crime of rebellion. But crimes committed dur-
ing combat were not punishable because Colombian criminal law 
applied to these crimes the laws of for international conflicts. Ac-
cording to international humanitarian law, combatants cannot be 
punished for their participation in the conflict, only for the commis-
sion of international crimes (Orozco, 1992). Rojas Pinilla´ s strategy 
to negotiate a peaceful solution for the conflict was to consolidate 
the support of the Army by pardoning the crimes they committed 
during La Violencia. The first decree, passed on August 21st 1953, 
gave amnesty only to those members of the army that had illegally 
taken part in the armed conflict; this is to say, those who joined any 
of the parties in the conflict. Once he had the Army´ s support, he 
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began a process of peace talks with each one of the guerrillas in or-
der to convince them to demobilize and decommission their guns. 
Once they demobilized and reincorporated to the economic life of 
the region, they had to wait one more year for amnesty to be grant-
ed.5 Many of the members of the liberal guerrillas took the gov-
ernment’s offer, but others, like the communist guerrillas, rejected 
it because it did not solve the substantial problems for which they 
were fighting. As a result, the government resumed the persecution 
against these groups.
The military dictatorship succeeded in obtaining the demobili-
zation of some of the groups, which led people to label Rojas as “the 
Pacifier”. However, the dictatorship was not peaceful at all. Mem-
bers of the government were involved in the killing of some stu-
dents in 1954 and in 1955 Rojas began what he deemed as a cam-
paign against communism and international subversion. The attacks 
against some of the areas of guerrilla presence did not cause their 
elimination and instead it brought solidarity from other groups. In 
May 1957 Rojas Pinilla was forced to leave the country because he 
lost the support of the elites and the conservative party.
Members of the elites negotiated in Sitges and Benidorm the 
end of partisan violence and a new political settlement. The agree-
ment included a constitutional reform that changed some of the rules 
of the game included in the political constitution. Elites interpreted 
La Violencia as the result of the fight between political parties to 
have access to power. In this way, they thought that by eliminating 
this fight they would eliminate all violence in Colombia. Thus, the 
leaders of the Conservative and the Liberal party created the Frente 
5 Rojas concern was not peace as such, but the economic life of the region. Some Hacendados 
created their own guerrillas to fight the conservative government. However they called for the 
military s´ support when they saw the perils of a social revolution.
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Nacional, a political agreement that ended the disputes between the 
two parties by sharing all positions in the Colombian government. 
Each political party would control half of the state´ s jobs, whereas 
the presidency was to be alternated between the two political par-
ties, beginning in 1958 with a Liberal president and ending in 1974 
with a Conservative one. With regard to liberal guerrillas, the par-
ties ordered them to demobilize and resume their legal political ac-
tivities (Afanador, 1993).
To be fair, the new arrangement did end violence between Lib-
erals and Conservatives. This is an arrangement that has proven to 
be stable and sustainable. But it only did so. The causes of violence 
were not addressed. Those who decided to remain in the commu-
nist guerrillas were offered unconditional amnesties or had to face 
military attacks. The agreements did not bring about peace and it 
only became the reason for more violence. Those who were excluded 
decided to remain in or join communist guerrillas. With a closed 
political system, political mobilization became armed mobilization. 
The seeds for the next 50 years of violence were planted.
During the 1960s Latin America witnessed the emergence of 
urban and rural guerrillas. In Colombia, as a result of international 
transformations and the national situation, many guerrillas emerged 
in different parts of the country. Liberal guerrillas and communist 
guerrillas decided to fight together and in 1966 they created the 
oldest existing guerrilla in the world. From this time on, FARC has 
fought to have an agrarian reform, to have a more just land distribu-
tion in the country. However, at that time FARC did not represent 
a danger for Colombia stability (Chernick, 2009).6
6 The army was more concern with other guerrillas, because of their impact in national public 
opinion like the ELN (Broderick, 2000; Broderick, 1975).
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The sixties and the seventies were times of increasing social 
mobilization. Peasants, workers, and indigenous peoples were find-
ing new ways of organizing and started to fight for their rights 
in the country. They fought against economic and social policies 
that excluded them and that created social and political inequalities. 
As the Commission created by the government in 1986 to analyze 
the causes of violence showed, in early eighties armed struggle re-
emerged with strength and in three different versions:
• First, the consolidation of M-19 as a guerrilla movement. They 
had evolved from being a movement that did sporadic actions 
to being a movement that considered themselves a people’s 
army. To consolidate this power they stole more than 5000 
guns from the main military barracks in the northern part of 
Bogotá.
• The oldest guerrillas –FARC, ELN and EPL- reactivated their 
actions in order to achieve national exposure, something they 
had lacked in the past, with the exception of ELN and their af-
fair with priest Camilo Torres.
• The emergence of new guerrilla organizations, such as Auto-
defensa Obrera ADO; Pedro León Arboleda PLA; Movimiento 
Armado Manuel Quintín Lame; Movimiento de Izquierda Revo-
lucionaria MIR; Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores PRT, 
amongst others.
This process of emergence and reemergence of old and new 
guerrillas was due to the increasing social exclusion, the military re-
pression in Latin America, and the example given by Central Amer-
ica guerrillas, especially the Sandinistas, in showing the possibility 
of defeating American supported armies in the region.
To President Julio Cesar Turbay (1978-1982) insecurity and 
immorality were the main problems Colombia had to face, and he 
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held that these two problems could cause the overthrowing of the 
government. Now the task was to find the internal enemy. Accu-
sations of torture and massive human right violations were com-
mon in Colombia. Amnesty International denounced in 1979, in 
his report on Colombia, the repressive and authoritarian character 
of Turbay’s administration. The leadership of M-19 was captured 
by the army, due to its own mistakes but also to the repression that 
was launched after they stole the guns in the Cantón Norte, the main 
military barrack in the north of Bogotá. Members of M-19 were de-
moralized because their organization was at the lowest point in all 
its brief history. But a group led by Rosemberg Pabón, also known 
as Comandante Uno, in February 1980 took the Dominican Embas-
sy and for 61 days kept hostages many members of the diplomatic 
body in Bogota.
The government had to start a process of negotiations with 
the guerrillas, something that was unprecedented, because it was 
the first time that Colombian government had to face the fact of 
social unrest, the existence of guerrillas and, above all, the limits 
of the military solution. M-19 demanded the release of all political 
prisoners in Colombia and the public recognition of human rights 
violations in Colombia. When their demands were satisfied, the or-
ganization would travel to Cuba and once in the island let their hos-
tages go. M-19 demanded that 300 political prisoners were released, 
a ransom of 50 million dollars, and social and political reforms to 
open a closed political system. The government refused to pay, and 
after 61 days M-19 decided to leave to Cuba, with one million dol-
lars allegedly given by the Israel government, and satisfied for hav-
ing exposed the human rights situation during Turbay’s administra-
tion (Castro, 2008).
The government refused to free political prisoners, but it did 
pass an amnesty law, that gave members of guerrillas 4 months to 
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demobilize and surrender to Colombian authorities. If the govern-
ment found that the law was successful, then it could extend its ben-
efits to all political prisoners. Turbay’s administration offered only 
this amnesty law. The social and political reforms that M-19 claimed 
were not taken into account. To this administration the problem for 
the existence of guerrillas had no relation at all with the social or 
political conditions existing in the country. They were considered 
terrorists that were part of an international conspiracy that wanted 
to attack Colombia and Colombians.
Peace processes in Colombia were extraordinary until 1982. 
In fact, the government only had peace talks when the two political 
parties were negotiating the new political settlement for the coun-
try. It was an agreement between elites. Colombian governments 
did not have a clear understanding of the Colombian conflict. They 
thought that guerrillas only wanted and needed legalization, hence 
the insistence in using a model based on amnesty laws.
In November 1981, Turbay created a Peace Commission, with 
the duty to elaborate a legal proposal for peace in Colombia, ad-
dressing the accusation of human rights violations and the economic 
transformation of the regions. But the process imagined by Turbay 
did not involve peace talks or any kind of negotiation, it did only 
involve the demobilization and decommission of guns. Again, the 
government read Colombian situation as if it was only a question 
of demobilizing criminal organizations without a political project. 
Turbay insisted on his strategy when in February 1982, six months 
before the end of his administration, proposed to pardon all the 
crimes committed by the guerrillas, with the exclusion of the gravest 
crimes, in exchange for their demobilization. To do so, Turbay gave 
them a period of thirty days to express the willingness to demobi-
lize. In exchange, M-19’s political prisoners sent him a letter where 
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they said they returned him these thirty days: Señor Presidente, le 
regalamos sus treinta días (Villamizar, 2002).
Peace processes 1982-1992: The end of amnesties laws and 
the beginning of peace negotiations.
The failure of Turbay´ s administration in achieving peace with 
guerrillas became part of the presidential campaign 1982-1986. 
During the campaign there was consensus on two facts: the need to 
fight poverty and the need to have a political solution for the armed 
conflict. In this way, the two main candidates recognized the social 
roots of Colombian armed conflict. Conservative politician Belisa-
rio Betancur became president of Colombia and decided to have 
peace talks with the guerrillas. He held that there were objective and 
subjective causes for violence in Colombia, and he understood that it 
was the government’s task to solve the objective causes of violence in 
the country. This implied recognition of the agenda guerrillas had. 
Thus, once their demands were satisfied, they would not have rea-
sons to fight. Betancur’s administration created the Plan Nacional 
de Rehabilitación in order to recover the economic and social condi-
tions of those areas affected by violence, as well as social conditions 
of people in the poorest regions of Colombia. He attempted to cre-
ate the conditions that allowed for peace talks with guerrillas. In his 
inauguration speech he said that he declared peace to Colombians. 
His administration was supposed to be one of peace. On the inter-
national arena he supported those initiatives that seek to bring about 
peace in Central America.
Following the steps of Turbay’s administration he also created 
a Peace Commission, with 40 members in what was labeled as the 
nationalization of peace. The Commission had the task of creating 
the conditions for a peace agreement. They focused on reaching a 
cease fire; start investigations on human rights violations, especially 
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forced disappearance and politically motivated murders; and inves-
tigations on the activities of the paramilitary organization MAS 
–Muerte a Secuestradores-. But the Commission had to face with 
spoilers inside the government, which the president of the Commis-
sion labeled as the enemies of peace. Because of these spoilers, Otto 
Morales, president of the Commission resigned and let the president 
reorganize the Commission.
Betancur’s administration passed an amnesty law in order to 
have a positive environment for peace talks. Unlike Turbay, Betan-
cur saw amnesty as the beginning of a process and as a sample of 
good will to get trust and start negotiations. The military, especially 
the commanders of the Army Fernando Landazabal and Bernardo 
Lema Henao, were against peace talks with M-19, mainly due to the 
humiliations the Army had suffered with the stealing of the guns in 
the Canton Norte and the taking of the Dominican Embassy.
Civil society thought that amnesty was an important step to 
reach peace in Colombia. Even economic organizations considered 
that a peace process was a very good idea for the country. People 
were enthusiastic about the perspectives for peace. To date is even 
possible to see some of the white doves that people painted at the 
time in order to show their support to peace negotiations and to a 
government that told them that the military solution to this kind of 
social problems was a wrong one.
However the Army felt that the president was not taken them 
into account and that he was leaving them outside the negotiations. 
To be fair with Betancur, it was clear that the military was not inter-
ested in a peace process, because they were under the conviction that 
the conflict could be won manu militar, the Army thought that they 
had the training and the ability to defeat guerrillas. To the Army, 
amnesties laws were the beginning of the demise of the government, 
because it implied that the guerrillas’ struggle was legitimate and 
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that the government had some defects in their legitimacy; a political 
solution implied also the recognition of a victory for international 
communism that was infiltrated in the system, a perception that 
reflected the purest thought of the doctrine of national security; 
and the idea that guerrillas were just terrorist and therefore did not 
deserve the treatment that was accorded to real revolutionaries or 
to combatants under international humanitarian law. In 1982, the 
Army held that “cualquier proceso de paz está condenado al fracaso 
pues solo intenta que el instrumento militar pierda confianza en su 
propia capacidad para enfrentar el problema con éxito…la tregua 
habrá servido únicamente para el fortalecimiento de la organización 
guerrillera” (Afanador, 1993: 96). It is interesting to note that this 
kind of thought is still held by those who oppose the recognition 
that in Colombia there is an armed conflicto, as if that recogni-
tion meant a status of belligerence for guerrillas (Restrepo, 1986; 
Ramírez & Restrepo, 1989).
As Antonio Navarro, former leader of M-19 told us in one in-
terview, the government did not really want peace. Or given the 
Army opposition could not have peace. For that reason they decided 
to go back to the mountains and to denounce the government for 
failing to fulfill its obligations during the peace process. According 
to Navarro, the main problem the peace process faced was that nei-
ther part really wanted to have peace. Both of them saw the peace 
talks as an opportunity to reorganize and continue the war. The 
government and M-19 both believed that they could win the war 
with the guns, so the failure of peace talks did not mean anything 
to them because anyways they could achieve their agenda via armed 
struggle (Interview Antonio Navarro, Bogotá: May 2010). In any 
case, M-19 understood that amnesty was not peace, and that before 
surrendering their guns the government needed to solve the prob-
lems of the country. In one communiqué, Jaime Batemán Cayón, 
leader of M-19, reminded the government that guerrillas were not 
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the problem, but other social problems that led people to take arms; 
Batemán held: La paz no consiste solo en el silencio de los fusiles sino 
en salarios justos, administración pública eficáz y al alcance del pueblo, 
salud y educación para todos. In sum, to Batemán negative peace was 
not enough, it was necessary to build positive and sustainable peace 
(Batemán, 1984).
While having a media-exposed peace negotiation with M-19, 
the government was having peace talks with FARC under other 
conditions and without the spectacle the peace process with M-19 
had. The main problems for the peace process were the kidnappings 
that were committed in territories controlled by FARC and their 
refusal to surrender guns. To FARC guns were not a problem, be-
cause, they held, as long as there was peace guns would not be fired, 
they do not fire by themselves. It is interesting to notice the claims 
FARC had to have peace talks, because, as Chernick shows it, in the 
agenda of FARC the same elements can be found in all the peace 
negotiations, namely, agrarian reform and political reform (Cher-
nick, 2009). In July 1983 FARC announced their agenda for the 
peace talks:
• Peace talks should take place in a FARC controlled territory.
• Transformation of guerrillas in self defense agrarian groups, 
which meant that they would not surrender their guns, perhaps 
due to the memory of the peace processes during the 1950s.
• To have a clear commitment of the Army with the process. 
The government held that this was the case, but reality would 
contradict it.
• Agrarian reform, especially distribution of land amongst peas-
ants and elimination of haciendas or latifundios.
• Cease fire with a commission that can verify that both parts 
honor their agreements.
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Peace talks had too many enemies, mainly coming from the 
Army. At last the process ended in may 1985, when M-19 announced 
that they were not going to take part in the process anymore, due 
to the betrayals of the government. This is a history that rejected 
people’s enthusiasm. In November 1985 M-19 took the Palace of 
Justice with the purpose of trying Betancur for this betrayal. This 
was an act that the Army did not want to take. The Army launched 
a bloody counter attack that brought about the deaths of some 95 
people and the disappearance of 11 more. To date former members 
of the Army are being tried for these crimes (Carrigan, 2009; Cas-
tro, 2008).
FARC kept their truce. As a result of this process people from 
the left and some members of FARC created the political party 
Unión Patriótica, to participate in the political life of the country. 
But again, the hidden enemies of peace sabotaged this process by 
killing more than 3000 members of the party, including two pres-
idential candidates, in what has been labeled as a political geno-
cide, even though according to international law this is not the case 
(Benavides, 2003).
The peace process 1986-1992: Elites honor people’s enthusi-
asm for peace.-
Virgilio Barco was elected president for the period 1986-1990. 
The perspectives for peace could not be darker when he took office. 
On November 6th 1985, M-19 had taken the Palace of Justice bring-
ing about a reprisal that caused the death of 95 people, killing most 
of the justices of the Supreme Court. M-19 was responsible for the 
taking of the Palace, which is a war crime that is punishable under 
international criminal law; but the re-taking of the Palace was one 
of the bloodiest acts Colombians had witnessed and proof that the 
Army was not willing to accept a peace process at any price.
Farid Samir Benavides Vanegas
216
CRITERIOS - Cuadernos de Ciencias Jurídicas y Política Internacional
Vol. 4. N.° 1 p. 199-229. Enero-junio de 2011
Barco kept working on the struggle against poverty, with mea-
sures aimed at improving people’s living conditions, and reforms 
that tried to democratizing the Colombian political system. The 
Constitution was reformed to have local elections and a process of 
decentralization was on its way. But Barco’s reforms did not address 
directly the problems of guerrillas. He did not deem important to 
have peace talks and he even pay little attention to the process that 
had began with FARC and that was showing some results, in spite 
of the fact of the persecution launched against the Unión Patriótica. 
Unsurprisingly, FARC decided not to believe in a peace process 
anymore, a position that kept during the negotiations with Andres 
Pastrana’s administration.
Given the bloody reaction to the attack launched to the Pal-
ace of Justice and the retaliation launched by the military, M-19 
realized that their options were few: either to take steps towards 
a peace process or to keep the fight –a fight they already knew it 
was unwinnable- with the danger of losing sight of their goals and 
their ethics. The massacre of 164 people committed by the guerrilla 
movement Ricardo Franco –accusing the victims of being mem-
bers of the army (this in a guerrilla with only 200 people)- caused 
repulsion and horror. Antonio Navarro and Carlos Pizarro –leaders 
of M-19-, told with horror what they saw and how impacted they 
were because of this degradation of the struggle of a leftist guerrilla. 
Pizarro even warned about the dangers of drug trafficking, which 
was showing its impact in guerrilla’s finances and in their structure 
and political goals (Interview with Antonio Navarro, May 2010).
It is important to remember that Colombia faced –and faces- 
several kinds of violence. While guerrillas were fighting the govern-
ment, drug traffickers had started a war against the Colombian state. 
Pablo Escobar responded to the threats to be extradited to the Unit-
ed States for drug related crimes with terrorist attacks that caused 
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the death of many people in Bogotá, Medellin and Cali. Within this 
context the government decided to differentiate between guerrillas 
and organized crime and in 1988 launched a new peace initiative 
that began accepting Colombian guerrillas as legitimate parts in a 
negotiation process. But the main difference with Betancur’s admin-
istration was that it was a coherent initiative that was to be applied 
to all guerrillas, avoiding the anarchy that characterized Betancur’s 
peace processes. Unlike the past experiences, amnesties were not the 
end or the goal of the process; they were just an element in a very 
complex process. The process had three stages, namely:
• Creating the conditions for peace with those groups that were 
interested in reaching an agreement with the government.
• A stage of transition, wherein the parties would design mecha-
nisms for their reincorporation into civilian life.
• Full incorporation of former guerrillas into democratic life. In 
this stage the government would guarantee political participa-
tion and would take measures to protect the lives of the demo-
bilized guerrilla members. Congress would pass an amnesty 
law and open the political system. Civil society would work 
towards the full incorporation of former combatants into nor-
mal life.
This proposal was accepted by M-19 and decided to take steps 
to approach the government. But unlike other peace talks, M-19 
accepted the steps suggested by the government, that is, a process 
of demobilization with the commitment of taking part in political 
life to democratically promote their goals. M-19 signed the agree-
ment during Barco’s administration, and kept their will to partici-
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pate in the peace process in spite of the fact that Carlos Pizarro and 
three more presidential candidates were killed by spoilers of the pro-
cess7. Members of M-19 were aware that the road to peace had no 
way back. They committed seriously to peace, mainly because they 
understood that a democratic regime was the best environment to 
achieve all the social and political reforms they wanted were fighting 
to achieve for many years (Interviews Otty Patiño; Navarro, Medel-
lin 2005 and Bogotá, 2010). The process had places for participa-
tion of civil society, in order to bring to Congress those reforms.
But Barco’s government had to stop the process of reform be-
cause members of Congress who were closed to Escobar and his allies 
tried to include a provision that prohibited the extradition of Colom-
bians. Following the Colombian tradition, the new political settle-
ment had to be included in the political constitution. In the elections 
for the Constitutional Assembly, M-19 was the second force after the 
liberal party. Their importance made them think that they could elect 
the next president of Colombia. However, due to their own mistakes 
and the options taken for the elections, they did not win and eventu-
ally disappeared as a political party. However, members of M-19 had 
remained faithful to their commitment to peace. They took part in 
the creation of Polo Democrático Alternativo PDA, which is currently 
the most important leftist political party in Colombia. Antonio Na-
varro has been mayor of Pasto and Governor of Nariño and PDA has 
elected twice the mayor of Bogotá. In the regions PDA became an 
7  The other three political candidates were not members of M-19. Luis Carlos Galán was a can-
didate for the Liberal party and the other two, Jaime Pardo Leal and Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, 
were candidates for the Unión Patriótica. In the case of Galán there is evidence that show that 
he was killed because of his support to extradition of drug traffickers. In the other three cases 
the motives are not clearly connected to drug trafficking. There are good reasons to believe that 
they were killed as part of the plan to exterminate the UP and to eliminate political opposition in 
the country.
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important political force, but persecution and their own mistakes had 
made them lose political support.
Barco’s and Gaviria administration started the only success-
ful peace process in the past 20 years. They both institutionalize a 
group of technocrats in charge of working on an agenda for peace. 
The main characteristic of the model was the reincorporation with 
empty hands (as Navarro labeled it), but with the firm commitment 
of working in the democratic spaces to obtain the reforms. Three 
actors were important in the process:
• The Army was initially against the process, but the govern-
ment managed to control them and to avoid spoilers during the 
process. If the military did not support the process, at least it 
did not sabotage it.
• Guerrillas, in particular M-19, understood that once a peace 
process begins there is no way back. Peace is not an easy road, 
and in spite of the fact that there would be spoilers in the pro-
cess, guerrillas cannot go easily back to take arms against the 
government. M-19 understood that democracy is the only way 
to achieve those reforms they were fighting for. There cannot 
be such a thing as an armed democracy. M-19 has honored 
their commitment to democracy and peace. If we trace their 
political behavior we will see that they defend democracy, even 
against rulers who want its demise.
• Civil society has had a strong commitment for peace. Their 
enthusiasm was met with the seriousness M-19 and the other 
guerrillas took the reform. For the first time elites and civil 
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society met in the enthusiasm for peace. And this is one of the 
reasons why this process has been so stable and sustainable.
Pastrana’s and Uribe´ s peace processes 1998-2010: The de-
mise of peace processes?
The last successful peace process was the one celebrated with 
the Corriente de Renovación Socialista CRS in 1994, following the 
structure established for the peace process with M-19 and the Mov-
imiento Armado Manuel Quintin Lame. In the presidential election 
1994-1998 Ernesto Samper was elected, but his peace agenda had 
to be postponed because of the accusations that during his cam-
paign he received more than five million dollars from the Cali Car-
tel. These accusations were followed by an investigation led by the 
Attorney General´ s Office and some of the members of Samper’s 
administration were sent to prison.
Samper’s legitimacy was under question. After the end of the 
peace process with Gaviria’s administration, that decided to bom-
bard La Uribe –the area where FARC was located- the very same 
day the Constitutional Assembly started its work, FARC entered 
in a process of reorganization and resettlement. With the death of 
Jacobo Arenas (1990), one of the historical leaders of FARC, FARC 
entered in a process where the military part took more importance 
than the political one. FARC got more involved in drug trafficking 
and in kidnapping. In fact this is the time when they implement-
ed their policy of random kidnapping (pesca milagrosa) which gave 
them important economic benefits.
 With this change in strategy, FARC became a strong army. 
During Samper’s administration FARC inflicted significant defeats 
to the Colombian Army. It seemed to them that they could win the 
war. The attacks to several military barracks –like El Billar, Patascoy 
and Las Delicias- showed a very strong and well organized guerrilla, 
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with the ability to fight directly the Colombian army. At the same 
time, it showed the Army the need to begin a process of reorganiza-
tion if they wanted to avoid more defeats.
The strength FARC had gotten during the Samper adminis-
tration made them important actors in Colombian political pan-
orama. The enthusiasm for peace had not faded and people were 
willing to see the government negotiate peace with FARC. In a 
well orchestrated political move, one of the members of Pastrana’s 
campaign team had a meeting with Marulanda and took a picture 
with him. The message that both parties wanted to send was that 
FARC was willing to negotiate peace with Pastrana. So Colombians 
elected Pastrana with a clear mandate to reach a peace agreement 
with FARC (Arias, 2009).
As it was mentioned earlier, the process was an uneasy one. 
FARC did not respect the rules of the zona de distension, and con-
tinue trafficking and kidnapping. It was clear that to FARC the 
peace process was just another way to buy them time and finish 
their process of reorganization. People’s enthusiasm for peace was 
coldly received. FARC and the government had established some 
spaces for discussion with different organizations, but these meet-
ing were more of a space where people went to speak before FARC 
but without a real participation in a peace process. The process was 
an exclusive task of the government and FARC. It was clear that 
the government did not have an agenda and that those in Pastrana’s 
administration lacked the experience and the ability to conduct a 
peace process. At the end, Pastrana’s mistakes and FARC hybris led 
the process to failure. This was the last time that there was national 
enthusiasm for peace. At the same time, Pastrana had approved Plan 
Colombia, an American funded military strategy to reorganize the 
army and to take all the necessary steps to defeat FARC.
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To analysts of peace processes in Colombia Pastrana’s failure 
can be explained if we take into account that both parties were not 
really committed to peace. FARC were under the impression –be-
cause of the defeats to the Army during Samper’s administration- 
that they could win the war, so the peace process was just one strat-
egy in a war that was conceived to be won militarily. At the same 
time, the Army saw the process as a necessary truce to reorganize 
and to design a new strategy for their war. Both parties thought 
they could win the war, so both of them assumed that the peace 
process was just a mock peace process, just for public consumption 
but without real expectations to end with a peace agreement. The 
Army did not support the process and in one occasion they were 
about to overthrow Pastrana for his weakness in the treatment of 
FARC.
To Carlos Nasi one of the reasons for the success of the peace 
processes during Barco’s and Gaviria’s administration was the favor-
able international environment. With the end of the Cold War, those 
groups that economically depended on the Soviet Union had to ne-
gotiate or had to embark in drug trafficking, as it was the case with 
FARC. But Nasi adds that there are other factors that need to be 
kept in mind to account for the success of these two processes. One 
of the factors is the military balance between armies and guerrillas. 
From his study Nasi shows that a defeated or weakened guerrilla 
is more likely to have peace talks with the government. However, 
this does not explain the willingness of the government to negotiate 
with a defeated enemy. Others factors need to be taken into account.
Nasi analyzes the role of spoilers and the role of the interna-
tional context. During Gaviria’s and Barco’s administration the 
Army, the main spoiler of the process, was heard and there was an 
inside process of negotiation to embark them in the process. Unlike 
the Betancur’s process, in these two cases the administration learnt 
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that peace cannot be reached without the Army’s participation and 
commitment (Nasi, 2009).
But one of the elements Nasi does not take into account for the 
participation of guerrillas is people’s enthusiasm for peace. One of the 
main reasons for the success of M-19 as a demobilized guerrilla is the 
fact that they could see themselves as part of the Colombian political 
process. They saw that they could have a strong constituency to take 
part in Colombian politics, as it was the case. So, it is important to 
recognize the role played by civil society, because they represent the 
perspectives of a post-conflict world. If guerrillas do not see the pos-
sibility of taking part in politics after the end of the process or at least 
to find spaces where to present their ideas, it is less likely for them to 
demobilize. But this is half the explanation. The other half has to do 
with the willingness of governments to reach peace agreements.
 The Barco’s and Gaviria’s peace processes were successful 
for one particular reason: the realization that the armed solution 
had not future. As we mentioned earlier, after the bloody end of the 
peace process with M-19, Barco decided not to negotiate and instead 
he opted for a military solution. The meager results and the realiza-
tion that war could not be won led the administration to negotiate 
with guerrillas, a process that brought about more and better re-
sults than the military solution. Thus, Pastrana’s peace process failed 
mainly because of the lack of will on both parties, and the illusion 
that they could win the war. FARC thought they were already in a 
stage where they could defeat the Army, and the Army thought with 
little time they could be there too. This explains why the process 
failed, even though there was an international and national favorable 
environment for peace. Spoilers sabotaged the process, but in this 
case spoilers were the two parties on the negotiation table. In Janu-
ary 2001, after a Colombian politician was kidnapped on the plane 
that was bringing him to Bogotá, Pastrana decided to break the 
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peace process. People’s support to peace disappeared, disappointed 
as they were for this missing opportunity. In its stead a language of 
war and exclusion was on its way.
For the elections 2002-2006 there were two presidential can-
didates for the second round. One of them was seen as the heir of 
Samper’s administration and a defender of peace, and the other one 
promised to re-establish authority in the country. Surprisingly for-
mer governor of Antioquia –a region in the northern part of Colom-
bia- won the election. In his campaign he had promised nothing but 
authority, but it was this simple message the one that was supported 
by the voters. However, later on people learn that in some areas 
paramilitaries supported the political allies of Uribe’s, although he 
said that this support only affected elections for Congress (more 
than 30% of members of Congress were investigated for links with 
paramilitaries), but not his own election (Valencia, 2008).
During Uribe’s administration more than 30000 members of 
paramilitaries demobilized. However, the results have not been as 
positive as it was expected. The process known as Justicia y Paz has 
been criticized for its lenient treatment of paramilitaries; and for the 
latter’s lack of commitment to tell the truth and to guarantee the 
right of no repetition. Victims have not been compensated and in 
many cases they have been victims of new attacks. Former members 
of the demobilized group of Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia AUC 
have joined other groups like the Aguilas Negras or what is known 
as Bandas Criminales Bacrim. The main policy of the government is 
what they call the policy of democratic security, which mainly seeks 
the military defeat of FARC. However, after having its best year in 
2008, this policy has started to show its limits and dangers. In 2009 
there was an increase of 17% in homicides in Colombia and a 30% 
in the activities of FARC, which shows that after 8 years of Uribe’s 
administration, his main promise remains unfulfilled. In a report 
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on the results of the war against FARC, the following conclusions 
are reached:
• The Colombian conflict has come to a stall. The demobilization 
of AUC did not bring about peace in the regions they used to 
control. Although we know more about their activities, the fact 
is that memory, truth, reconciliation and justice remain elusive. 
FARC has moved to new areas of the territory, so the conflict 
has reached new populations but has not decrease its activity.
• FARC has retaken their initiative in some areas, which shows 
this regained control.
• The policy of democratic security has reached a limit. Either we 
have a bloodier war in Colombia or it is necessary to open new 
avenues for peace talks.
• The current response of the Army is to start a new process of 
change, similar to Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota. This pro-
cess, called Salto Estratégico, seeks to take the Army to the new 
places of FARC control, which means extending the effects of 
the armed conflict.
The militarization of the conflict and the failure of the Pas-
trana’s administration led to the discredit to any idea of a negotiated 
peace. The media contributed to this view of peace, because they 
presented the idea of peace as connected to support to terrorism. 
President Uribe continuously attacked members of the opposition 
and NGOs; and anyone who advocated for a negotiated solution of 
the conflict was labeled as a terrorist or as someone who helped ter-
rorists against Colombian interests. Uribe held the idea that in Co-
lombia there was no armed conflict. Colombian’s problem was the 
terrorist threat, which was even responsible for Colombian underde-
velopment. According to Uribe, had no existed guerrillas, Colombia 
would be a fully developed country (Gaviria, 2005).
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Conclusion: What are the perspectives for peace?
Uribe and his allies had planned to run for a third term as 
president of Colombia. He had already changed the constitution to 
run for a second term –reelection was prohibited in Colombia- and 
wanted to do the same to run for a third one. But the Constitutional 
Court found that it was against the constitution because of formal 
reasons, but also because a third term would affect the democratic 
character of the Colombian constitution. Former Uribe’s Minister 
of Defense Juan Manuel Santos ran for the presidency and won 
the election with more than nine million ballots. Santos’ campaign 
stressed the continuity of Uribe’s policies, especially the rejection 
of any kind of dialogue with FARC. However, at the end of July 
2010 FARC released a video where Alfonso Cano, current leader of 
FARC, made a call for peace talks, reminding the government that 
FARC is not defeated and that it is unwise to think so. The elected 
vice president, former union activist and ex member of the commu-
nist party Angelino Garzón, responded positively, but under several 
conditions, such as the end of kidnappings, the end of forced re-
cruitment of children, and a clear commitment to peace. However, 
from his statement it is clear that the military way will be privileged 
and if FARC decides to demobilize they could do so, but without 
the government weakening its position.
The peace process with Pastrana left FARC the impression that 
they could win the war. Their military victories led them to think 
that the Army could be defeated and therefore the peace process was 
just another strategic move in the war. During Uribe’s eight years of 
power FARC had to face several attacks by the Army, the most im-
portant the killing of Raul Reyes in Ecuador, which brought about 
a conflict with that country. But FARC has not been defeated and 
there are no reasons to believe that it will be so. In spite of the confi-
dence of the Army for a military victory, some studies show that the 
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policy of democratic security is basically a failure and has reached its 
own limit. In a study by Isaza and Campos (2008), they show the 
numbers of this policy and conclude that is an extremely expensive 
and inefficient policy, not only in economic terms but also in human 
security terms. They show that 81.2% of public jobs in Colombia are 
for people in the defense and security sector. 58,4% of salaries are 
paid to people working in the Ministry of Defense; 65% of money 
for investment go to military equipment. The Colombian state has 
to pay more than 2 million euros to get the effective retirement of 
one person in the guerrilla, either because s/he has been captured 
and sent to prison or because s/he has been killed. In sum, it is 
cheaper to talk and to have a social policy that eliminates social ex-
clusion, than to pay 16.000 million euros to defeat the about 8000 
members FARC has (Isaza & Campos, 2008).
Colombian conflict has moved between the military solution 
and dialogue. Both actors in the conflict have lived under the im-
pression that they could win the war, but reality has taught them 
otherwise. Economically and politically the only reasonable solu-
tion is a peace process. But it has to be a process with a transparent 
agenda, not losing sight of the final goal and being aware that a 
peace process is a just that, a process with steps forward and steps 
backward. It remains to be seen if the new president has the will and 
the environment to have a peace process with FARC. So far people 
believe there have been some changes that let us hope for a break in 
the policies. However, others believe Santos’ administration will be 
no different from Uribe’s. But statements and recent appointments 
leave a shred of hope. In any case, if elites do not take into account 
people’s mobilization for peace, they have to realize that there is a 
movement for peace at the local level that is becoming stronger, and 
once it reaches the national level then elites would need to honor 
their enthusiasm, as it happened in 1991.
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